What could have been had the Islamic Revolution been averted in 1979...   An extremely deep dive in regard to where the US was positioned with their ally, the Shah's Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN), in the period 1973 to 1978 when this article was written and published.  It contains specific data on the training of crews  by the USN and the intended turn over of the vessels I cited in my posts above.   INN Order of Battle - The Imperial Iranian Navy     Building a Navy in a Hurry By Lieutenant Commander Charles R. Jones, USN January 1978   Proceedings   Vol. 104/1/899   Iran employs the world’s largest fully operational hovercraft squadron to deter terrorism and to protect a diversified maritime commerce that ranges from the ancient dhow unloading at low tide in Hormuz Strait to the nearly 200 tankers per day that ply the narrow strait. But more than hovercraft are needed if Iran is to discourage Soviet adventurism and he prepared   In a short period of five to seven years, the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) is being expanded from a coastal force, oriented around patrol boats, to a “blue-water navy with some of the most modern and complex weapon systems in existence. It isn’t being ac­complished, though, without a great many growing pains. Recruiting and training the added personnel are tough enough, and the problems are compounded by the acquisition of 30 ships and 40 helicopters of differing classes, builders, and countries of origin. The IIN is overcoming just such problems with the assistance of U.S. Navy advisors.   For centuries, Iran has been known as a land of legendary romance, immortalized in verses of Persian poets. Today, its appeal is that of a rapidly modern­izing country where age-old institutions and modes of life are side by side with modern transportation, buildings, and industry. Iran is as large as that por­tion of the United States east of the Mississippi. But its population is only about 35 million since vast areas of central Iran are made up of two large, unin­habitable salt deserts. Tehran, the site of IIN head­quarters and the center of the U. S. Navy advisory effort, has been the capital of Iran since 1785. With a population estimated at 4.2 million, Tehran is the country’s leading commercial center.   Long before the discovery of oil, control of Iran was considered of great strategic significance in the Middle East policies of a number of countries, par­ticularly Great Britain and Russia. Since World War I, Iran’s importance has been greatly increased be­cause it has been one of the world’s largest oil ex­porters. Therefore, to the European countries in par­ticular, stability in the Persian Gulf ensures a con­tinuous flow of oil and a stable economy.   In an interview published in the 20 January 1977 issue of the Tehran Journal, the Shah of Iran had the following to say to a Newsweek magazine corre­spondent about the threat to the Persian Gulf: . . . the threat is obviously the continuation of the threat in the other theaters of the world. The threat to the security of the Persian Gulf is the continuation of the vacuum of the local powers being filled by the super powers and the con­tinuation of this into the Indian Ocean. Or vice versa. The Indian Ocean is an extension of the sta­bility of the Persian Gulf. If the riparian states of the Persian Gulf can assure this security of the Persian Gulf, then the big powers will see that there is no need, no use, to get inside because they would be singled out and announced to all the countries of the riparian states. So it is the same in the Indian Ocean. If the countries of the Indian Ocean can assure the stability and security of the region, there won’t be need for the Russians to say that you are going to Diego Garcia for Machiavel­lian purposes, and you saying that the Russians are in Berbera.   No Western or Communist-bloc country could take on the peacekeeping function to ensure the sta­bility of the Persian Gulf for the same reasons that the Shah opposes the superpowers from filling this role. Moreover, the nature of the task, depending largely on the location of the authority concerned for its effectiveness, suggests that the authority be a re­gional power. Iran, possessing the most modern and capable military force in the region, is the most likely candidate to fill this role, and from all indica­tions the Shah would like to have his country do just that. Iran has a stable monarchial government, main­tains friendly relations with both the United States and Russia, engages in significant trade with them, and enjoys their technical assistance and other forms of support. It has demonstrated notable restraint, both in avoiding war with Iraq despite numerous border clashes and in renouncing its claim over Bahrain in 1968.   Any sustained threat to the passage of Iranian oil through the Persian Gulf would deal a serious eco­nomic blow to Iran’s aims for development. Protec­tion of this vital sea-lane of communication is proba­bly second in priority only to a Soviet threat to Iran’s political independence. Now, and increasingly so in the future, Iran can probably defend these waters against most hostile acts by any single Persian Gulf state or existing insurgent group. However, the de­struction of even one loaded supertanker would pose an environmental disaster for the Iranian fishing in­dustry and conceivably a hazard to continued naviga­tion within the narrow confines of the existing channels. Prior to a 5 March 1975 boundary agreement between Iran and Iraq, one of the primary threats to Iran in the Persian Gulf had been the border dispute involving the Shatt-al-Arab, the estuary at the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers through which flow the oil exports from southwestern Iran. It appears that the threat has been lessened since the agreement was reached. The threat of the spread of insurgency from the province of Dhofar in Oman, northward to areas that might affect passage in the Strait of Hormuz, is the reason the Shah in 1973 entered into the agreement.   !The agreement was confirmed by a treaty in June 1975. It contained three protocols: the border was defined as the centerline of the main navigable channel of the Shatt-al-Arab (previously, Iraq had claimed sovereignty over all of the Shatt-al-Arab); the land boundary; and the border security and control arrangements. In return, Iran ceased supporting the Kurds in their rebellion against Iraq which resorted to direct involvement of Iranian forces in trying to stamp out this movement.   Clearly the design of naval forces adequate to resist political pressure, convoy maritime commerce, deter terrorism, and, if necessary, fight a conventional war at sea is complex and ambitious. Iran’s naval expan­sion may be viewed, first, as a general indication of the Shah’s determination to defend his own interests; second, as an instrument to discourage the application of pressure on Iran in peacetime; third, as a bal­anced force to protect his growing maritime interests ln peacetime; and fourth, in the event of regional hostilities, to defend Iran’s own (and perhaps neutral) shipping. The achievement of these goals is uncer­tain, but clearly it will take the better part of the next ten years.   The Imperial Iranian Navy’s initial effort to as­sume the Persian Gulf peacekeeping role has been a surveillence effort. This has been limited to the identification of shipping, the reporting of suspicious maritime activity, and the control of arms flow to subversive elements inside Iran. One minor exception to this was the 1971 occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, where the IIN used hovercraft to land the troops. The purpose of the operation Was to control militarily strategic islands in the strait. It is now rumored that a military base exists |here. The only opposition to the landing on the islands consisted of a handful of rifle shots. There were no casualties since the only opposition came from fishermen. The entire Persian Gulf area is vul­nerable to sea-based acts of sabotage of the facilities and installations associated with the oil industry. Iran’s refinery at Abadan, one of the largest in the world, is within mortar range of Iraq, and the major offshore oil port on Kharg Island can easily be reached by a raiding party from that country.   Having no access to pipelines, Iran depends on sea routes for the export of oil; therefore, the Hormuz Strait, less than 30 miles in width and with an even narrower deep-draft ship channel, is the choke point or jugular vein of the Middle East oil trade. Approx­imately 200 tankers per day pass through the strait bound for Europe and Japan. Should the shipping channel be closed as the result of some hostile act, the Western world’s economic stability and some weaker governments would rapidly disintegrate. To protect this vital strait, Iran has built its naval forces accordingly: with minesweeping ships and helicop­ters; with antisubmarine destroyers, submarines, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft; and with surface-to-surface missile equipped destroyers, frig­ates, and patrol boats.   As the IIN grows with the new ship acquisitions and becomes more confident in its role as the Persian Gulf defender, the Shah would like to extend his in­fluence to the Indian Ocean. One of the Shah’s plans is to form an alliance with the nations controlling the choke points to the Indian Ocean. This would in­clude South Africa once its government renounces apartheid. In this way the regional powers will be capable of handling any threats within the region, thus eliminating any excuse for the superpowers to build up naval and military forces within the region. In order to implement this grandiose plan, the Shah has been looking at acquisitions of larger ships, in­cluding numerous rumors about aircraft carrier in­quiries, in addition to the acquisitions already planned.   The Shah is now building a modern navy headed by four Spruance-class destroyers (DD-993). These ships, to be built upon completion of the U. S. Navy’s 30-ship program, will be fitted out with antiair, antisubmarine, and surface-to-surface weapon systems. Given the slippage in both construction and support, these ships are not likely to begin operating until the mid-to-late 1980s. The DD-993's will be backed up by nearly a dozen destroyers and frigates of U. S. and British construction. Included will be a cruiser, four British-built Vosper Mk 5 frigates, and two Allen M. Sumner-class (DD-692) destroyers converted by the U. S. Navy to DDGs for the IIN in the early 1970s, logistic ships from Britain and Germany, and perhaps guided-missile frigates from the United States. There is also some speculation that the IIN is interested in an Invincible-class through-deck cruiser with short/vertical takeoff and landing aircraft of British design. The Iranians have purchased three Tang-class diesel-powered submarines, the Trout (SS-566), Wahoo (SS-565), and Tang (SS-563), all built in the middle 1950s.   Current plans call for the overhaul of these submarines in the United States prior to delivery to the IIN in 1979-1981. The first of the overhauls has already begun. Newly built supply and logistics ships have also been purchased from German and British shipyards. An IIN strike force equipped with British SR.N6 and BH-7 hovercraft (armed with light automatic weapons) forms the world’s largest fully operational hovercraft squadron. These craft help de­fend Iran against intrusion by their ability to navi­gate shoal waters and otherwise gain access to unap­proachable coasts.   In order to assist in protecting the Persian Gulf and its approaches from submarine attack, the naval air arm is also expanding. P-3F Orions combine with SH-3D and RH-53D helicopters to provide airborne surveillance, antisubmarine warfare, and minesweep­ing capabilities. In addition, Bell helicopters and Fokker F-27 Friendship turboprops provide logistics mobility. The U.S. Navy is also involved in an advi­sory and support effort with the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF), since that service has recently added the F-14 to its inventory which also includes the F-4, F-5, and P-3.   A major base, maritime headquarters, and ship­yard are in use at Bandar Abbas, just inside the Strait of Hormuz. Further inside the Persian Gulf at Bushire are a naval air station, a small naval base, and a repair facility. Smaller naval bases are in operation at Khorramshahr, and the island of Kharg in the Persian Gulf. A new major base and shipyard are being planned for Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman, which permits access to the Indian Ocean even if the Strait of Hormuz should be blocked off by some hostile act. A naval training center on the Caspian Sea is in operation. When the expansion is completed if the next two to three years, the quality of equipment available there will be as high as that in U.S. Navy training centers.   Governmental agencies in Iran, continually experience shortages, particularly in the areas of labor and concrete. A current bottleneck is being experienced n the construction of housing at the Bandar Abbas and Bushire naval bases. In fact, the housing short­ly is so acute that the Iranian Navy has purchased two Italian passenger liners, TSS Michael Angelo and Raffaello, to serve as interim barracks ships, another growth pain occurred at the shipyard in Bandar Abbas. Originally scheduled to have opened n July 1975, it went into partial operation late last year. In this case the foreign contractor had difficulties in clearing materials through Iranian customs, The IIN is now heavily dependent upon the U.S. Navy schools in order to train the prospective DD-993 and submarine crews. However, some of the burden on U.S. Navy schools should be removed with the recent opening in Iran of many of the class A schools required for the Imperial Iranian Navy. U.S. Navy trainers have been active in the planning and imple­menting of in-country training using the A school training plans translated into Persian. Evaluations of the quality of training being provided the IIN show results comparable to those obtained in U.S. Navy Schools- These positive results should reduce the number of IIN trainees, about 1,000 per year, who attend U.S. Navy schools now. The British also advise the IIN in the operation of a fleet training center at the Bandar Abbas Naval Base.   With the newly acquired oil wealth, the country resembles a boom town, experiencing the same con­duction pains as would be expected from a boom atmosphere. The IIN, as with all other business and thus resulting in construction delays. Brown and Root of Houston, Texas, the contractor for Chah Bahar Naval Base and Shipyard, has applied for a provision for customs exemption in the contract in order to avoid a repetition of the Bandar Abbas de­lays.   When a nation has a great many petro-dollars available, it is relatively easy to buy equipment and facilities. However, it is infinitely more difficult to recruit and train qualified personnel to operate all of the sophisticated hardware associated with these pur­chases. In 1975, the IIN had 13,000 officers and men and expected to quadruple in size within five years. Some of the problems that must be faced:   ►   A limited population base to recruit from ►   A literacy rate estimated at 40% ►   Lower educational requirements for enlistment (a high school education is required for officers and an average of a ninth grade education is obtained for enlisted) ►   Lower pay than comparable civilian rates in the booming economy ►   Long enlistments—an 11-year initial obligation with little hope of getting out before 20 years’ serv­ice is completed ►   A historical reliance on the army to defend the country, implying little exposure to naval affairs   Obviously the magnitude of the present and future major U.S. systems delivery programs is ambitious. These programs support the Shah’s overall aim for eventual industrial independence by stimulating the growth of an industrial base capable of producing military equipment. Still, very basic problems exist in the lack of education and skilled manpower, and as in industry, the naval establishment leans heavily upon foreign technicians. It is estimated that upward of 40,000 Americans are in Tehran, along with large contingents of other foreigners. The infusion of military technology is a heavy drain upon the trained manpower base. The Imperial Iranian Navy is faced with significant shortcomings which can prevent it from becoming operationally effective in a battle of any duration. New equipment will continue to arrive before the maintenance facility construction is com­plete, creating problems of critical shortages of ware­housing and storage space and lack of inventory con­trol. Thus, long-lead-time equipment may not be available to provide support when required. Another significant shortcoming is the reluctance of senior of­ficers to change traditional attitudes and procedures. In addition, in December 1975 the Imperial Iranian Navy’s Commander in Chief and Deputy Com­mander in Chief, one other admiral, and another 20 officers were jailed for corruption and graft. In spite of the upheaval, the IIN continues to advance and assimilate new equipment and technology.   Since World War II, the United States has been assisting friendly foreign countries in establishing and maintaining adequate military forces consistent with their economic stability and growth—to maintain internal security and resist ex­ternal aggression. The reason for furnishing such as­sistance is based upon the tenet that the security and economic well-being of friendly foreign countries are essential to the security of the United States. This principle is inherent in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Nixon Doctrine.   Security Assistance, the program under which the U.S. Navy is in Iran, comprises the sale of defense articles and services, the grant of such articles and services without reimbursement in appropriate cases, economic supporting assistance in exceptional cases to offset costs of maintaining armed forces, and grant assistance to public safety forces such as police. Iran comes under the first category, foreign military sales, which is administered by and the responsibility of the Department of Defense. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State is responsible for continuous supervision and general direction of for­eign military sales, including but not limited to de­termining whether there shall be a sale and, if so, the amount.   Not all of Iran’s neighbors are pro-Western. Iran is bordered to the north by the Soviet Union, to the west by Iraq, and to the east by Afghanistan, all Communist-oriented countries to one degree or another. For this reason, it is important for the United States and other Western powers to maintain a friendly ally in this area. In the past three years, Iran has committed itself to spending more than $10 billion for defense-related articles from the United States. This represents a sizable assist to the U.S. balance of payments problem. During a period of high unemployment in the United States, foreign military sales to Iran represent jobs to Americans. Besides jobs, the sales keep open production lines that might otherwise close down, and, by increasing the number of units produced, they reduce unit costs of weapons being purchased for our services. Selling American equipment to Iran helps continue Iran s dependence upon the United States to provide re­placement parts and associated specialized training, thus reducing the possibility of losing Iran as an ally.   Training students to operate the sophisticated hardware purchased in the United States has impor­tant side benefits. Training in U. S. Navy schools exposes young Iranians to the American way of life and thought processes and also advances the use of the English language in another segment of the world. English is the second language of Iran. The training also raises the education level of these sailors, who have at best the equivalent of a ninth- grade education before enlisting in the IIN. Ideally, these factors will all contribute to promoting a con­tinued stable, friendly government in Iran.   After the unpleasantness resulting from the American involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. national defense policy has shifted to that of supplying weapons and technology to build up a friendly for­eign government’s defense posture, thus reducing the possibility of Americans becoming involved in skir­mishes abroad. Therefore, it is important to the United States to build the IIN into a self-sufficient and capable fighting force.   This country has maintained a military mission in Iran since September 1941. Its original concern was with lend-lease assistance to the Middle East, but in 1943, by formal agreement between the two gov­ernments, a U.S. Army Mission (ARMISH) to the Im­perial Iranian Armed Forces was established and has continued ever since. The U. S. Navy was not in­volved until the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in 1950. The separate organizations were consolidated in 1958. In 1969, a contract was signed adding a Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) to ARMISH-MAAG. About one quarter of the approximately 100 U. S. Navy ad­visors are MAAG, acting as a headquarters advisory component, and the remainder are TAFT, acting as one-on-one field advisors with an IIN counterpart. All advisors are chief petty officers or above.   Finally the LOA is for­warded to the MAAG to present to the IIN for signature. Once signed, the Navy Section begins advising n the specialized areas pertaining to the equipment being purchased. This entire process of obtaining a slgned contract takes a minimum of three to four months, depending on the size of the purchase. he question that each individual involved in arms sales to Iran must answer in his own mind is this: “Is it morally right to expand the proliferation of arms by selling and providing instruction in the use of weapons to the developing nations of the world?” Arms sales to Iran are related to sustaining the continued free flow of Persian Gulf petroleum resources to the United States and our allies, particularly Western Europe and Japan. Our interests also involve keeping Iran favorably disposed to the United States as a strong friend and ally in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area. A result of congres­sional action within a specified number of days, comportance to the advisory effort in Iran that it assigns an Air Force major general to command the ARMlSH-MAAG. The Navy Section MAAG, which is headed by a rear admiral, acts as a clearinghouse for forces, requests, and communications between the CCS. Chief of Naval Operations and the IIN. The Navy TAFT furnishes advisors for each of the directorates, e.g., Personnel Directorate, and advisors to the fleet, to the training centers, and to each major equipment project.   When the IIN requests information from the MAAG concerning the possible purchase of a new piece of equipment, the Navy Section must staff it prior to forwarding the request to CNO. The plans advisors look at how the new equipment fits in with c e overall growth plans set by the IIN. The opera­tions advisors put together recommendations for the use of the equipment. The training advisors establish e training requirements to operate the new equip­ment and along with the planning advisors ascertain e impact on the IIN personnel strength require­ments. The logistics advisors determine the price and availability of the new equipment along with the follow on support requirements.   Once this package is assembled, it is forwarded to CNO. A letter of offer and acceptance (LOA), a final government-to-government contract, is pre­pared and sent to the Defense Security Assistance agency of the Department of Defense. Next, the secretary of State’s office will determine whether the sale falls within their dollar guidelines. If the amount of the sale exceeds $25 million or if the end term appears on the major defense equipment list, Congress must be notified. Should Congress fail to signal decisions barring arms shipments to Turkey may be to increase the importance of Iran to the United States if Turkey should turn away from its strong pro-United States position. At the same time, the United States does not desire to alienate the Arab nations by showing too much favoritism toward Iran.   Two factors, economic and military in nature, seem to have the greatest influence on the existing status of the relationship between the United States and Iran. The economic factor centers on oil. The oil demand income is of such importance to Iran that its present policy is to sell oil to any country. The United States is among Iran’s oil customers and will continue to require oil from the Middle East until alternate energy programs are developed. Oil prices could cause, at some time, a deterioration in this re­lationship. The sale of oil for high prices is vital to Iran’s pace of development, but the economic influ­ence of these prices creates inflationary havoc in the Western world. The military consideration centers on the massive U.S. sales of highly sophisticated military equipment to Iran. These sales are designed to strengthen Iran’s position in the Persian Gulf. They also strengthen the U.S. position there and prevent the Soviet Union from filling the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the British naval forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971. This massive military buildup will result in a stronger Iran and a deterioration of the relationship between the United States and the Arab countries should Iran employ her armed forces in an aggressive manner. At some future point, it is possible that Iran may demand that U. S. naval forces stationed in the Persian Gulf be withdrawn. There are some indica­tions that Iran may have lost some confidence in the U.S. willingness to protect it from the Soviet Union or perhaps India. Hence, Iran may be seeking to bal­ance its international relationships by promoting closer relations with the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, as long as Iran needs U. S. weapons and weapons support, a continued mutual dependence will result, and the Imperial Iranian Navy will con­tinue to grow in a hurry.     Author After six years of enlisted service during which he rose to ETl(SS), Lieutenant Commander Green was commis­sioned in 1967 through the NESEP program. He re­ceived his B.A. in mathematics from the University of Kansas and his M.S. in computer science from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He has served in the USS 1 Dale (DLG-19) and USS Downes (DE-1070) and in the diesel submarines Spinax (SS-489) and Raton (AGSS-270). From 1975 until 1977, he was the MAAG submarine training advisor to -the Impe­rial Iranian Navy as part of the ARMISH-MAAG. He is now a student at the Naval War College in Newport.  

In your opinion is it proper German for the time period?

Here's another a 1977 Dated one, forgot where I found this online, nice liner right, a civilian like quality to it.

Sir Alec Guinness   From his WIKI   the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve in the Second World War, initially as a seaman in 1941, before receiving a commission as a temporary Sub-lieutenant on 30 April 1942 and a promotion to Temporary Lieutenant the following year, Guinness then commanded a Landing Craft Infantry at the Allied invasion of Sicily, and later ferried supplies and agents to the Yugoslav partisans in the eastern Mediterranean theatre.   And his write up on the U.S. Naval Institute on his actions off Sicily.   As the British Say, a slight Cock Up ,   Though not devastating nor with the possible tragic results that could of happened.    World War II records confirm that Alec Guinness brought ashore the first invasion force at Sicily. However, things had not gone according to plan. Hours before the invasion, Guinness had maneuvered his landing craft alongside a troopship to pick up 200 soldiers from the 5th Battalion of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment). Boarding the soldiers became extremely hazardous, owing to heavy seas that damaged the ship’s bow ramps. They became useless for transporting the troops to the landing craft. The soldiers had to jump into the LCI as waves lifted the craft alongside the troopship. In the confusion of getting the men safely on board, Guinness missed the signal to all ships that the invasion had been postponed by one hour. Once free of the troopship, he headed straight for land just left of the Cape Passero lighthouse. He was eight miles away from his landing beach point in his assigned quadrant passing other landing craft that were circling off the beach. He beckoned them to follow, but none did.

I don´t know if this Iron Cross is authentic or not but maybe I can help a bit with the engraving.    First line: Two names and between them what looks like a part of a unit designation 5./ ? (5. Kompanie) Second line:"mit herzlichem Glückwunsch" (with congratulations) Third line: zur Frdl.Erg. an abbrevation most likely of "zur freundlichen Erinnerung" (as a kind recollection). Note the  difference "F" and "f". Fourth line: Location Fifth line: Date

The medalset of Vice-admiral Jacob Cardinaal.    

A ribbonbar with the full Dutch Korea entitlement and the TMPT (Military Performance Event Cross) cross in it. Enjoy.   Herman

Nice!   -Ski

Nice uniform, a rural police tunic is on the list to get, looks a like C96 holster on there . PM sent 

Please see the photos. I bought a group of belt buckles at auction. Apparently a collector had a very large collection on loan to a small military theme museum in PA. Upon his death the family chose to recall the collection and auctioned it off. Put a serious dent in the museum.   Anyway, this buckle is listed as "pre-civil war dragoon". The eagle is identified as the French standard Imperial Eagle from Napoleon's second reign.   The buckle is plate brass, not cast. Not sure what the metal is for the laurel. Eagle appears to be brass.   Many questions. Most important is age and authenticity. I have no idea what the uniform equipment from that era looks like. Not gonna hold my breath on the notion it is from the 1815 era.   Thoughts, comments?  

I have different styles of back packs that are property marked to the Railway Police, regular police, Bavarian, & Land Police.  If putting together a NS period mannequin I would look for one that is marked but accept one Army marked as the Police did sometimes draw equipment from the Heer.  Here is an example of one with all Pollce marked equipment.   BTY, I have a spare Police marked fur box pack if you want to contact me off line.   polblade@aol.com    

Hello,   I got this insignia on a 1953 french helmet pith.   I was wondering if this could be a viet Minh insigna or a a early PAVN one ?    This insigna is metal made.      Thanks    A.S.